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Cooperation with National Systems
JEFFREY L. BLEICH*

This report concerns the provisions of the International Law Committee (ILC) Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
regarding cooperation between the ICC and national jurisdictions. The
comments of the Working Group are intended to stimulate discussion
of the relevant Draft provisions and are not intended to reflect any formal conclusion of the International Law Association (ILA) Working
Group.
I. BACKGROUND

For purposes of evaluating the current ILC Draft, the term "cooperation between the court and national jurisdictions" has a limited
meaning. Cooperation between the court and national jurisdictions is,
of course, implicated by virtually every provision of the Draft ILC
Statute. With respect to this report, and the report of the Preparatory
Committee, consideration is limited only to affirmative acts of judicial
assistance by States in furtherance of the Court's jurisdiction. Specifically, these acts of cooperation involve assistance by States in conducting ICC investigations, facilitating trial, and executing the Court's
sentence.
The principal issues raised by the "cooperation" provisions of the
ILC Draft are:
1. Whether the ICC should have authority to conduct independent
investigations and compel the cooperation of States to assist in those
investigations consistent with the principle of "complementarity?"
2. Whether the ICC should have authority to compel States to arrest, detain, and transfer suspected criminals notwithstanding that
state's obligations under domestic law or with regard to extradition
treaties?
3. To the extent that the ICC may override some traditional limitations on extradition, what bases, if any may, a State raise for not
transferring a person subject to an ICC arrest warrant?
4. What "supervisory jurisdiction," if any, will the ICC have to assist States in matters where the ICC has concurrent jurisdiction, has
* Lecturer in Human Rights, University of California at Berkeley School of Law;
Partner, Munger, Tolles & Olsen, San Francisco; B.A., 1983, Amherst College; MPP,
1986, Harvard University; J.D., 1989, University of California at Berkeley; Law Clerk to
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 1990-91; Law Clerk to Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
1991-92.

DENY. J. INT'L L. & POLYV

VOL. 25:2

deferred to the jurisdiction of the national courts, and has been called
upon by that nation to assist?
5. What mechanism, if any, should be employed for effectuating an
ICC request in cases in which the State from which assistance is
sought does not have a functioning judicial system?
These issues are addressed below.
II. THE ILC DRAFT STATUTE
As explained below, cooperation by individual States in assisting
the Court is implicated principally by Articles 26 (investigation of alleged crimes), 28 (arrest), 29 (pre-trial detention and release), 31 (persons made available for prosecution), 51 (cooperation and judicial assistance), 52 (provisional measures), 53 (transfer of an accused), 54
(obligation to extradite or prosecute), 55 (rule of specialty), 56 (cooperation with States not parties), 57 (communications and documentation), 58 (recognition of judgments), and 59 (enforcement of
judgments).'
In general, the Draft was intended to promote flexibility - not to
require "complete reliance upon national law and practices." 2 Nevertheless, consistent with the principle of "complementarity," the Draft Statute seeks to maximize reliance upon voluntary cooperation with the
Court by utilizing official government organs, and avoiding initiation
of an investigation within a State's territory against that State's
wishes. 3 Likewise, although the Draft provides the ICC with extensive
powers to require States to assist in the arrest and transfer of suspected criminals, it limits the scope of this authority based upon
whether the State party has accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to a specific crime.
A. Investigation
Articles 26, 51, and 52 provide for cooperation between States and
the prosecutor with respect to the investigation of alleged crimes. Article 26 provides that the prosecutor has the authority to detain and
question suspects, victims, and witnesses (subsection (2)(a)), collect
physical evidence (subsection 2(b)), conduct on-site investigations (subsection 2(c)), protect individuals from intimidation (subsection 2(d)),
1. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter
1994 ILC Draft].
2. See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, at 38, 199, U.N. Doc. A/50/22
(1995) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Comm. Report].
3. Id. at 37,
197 ("[O]nly in limited circumstances, where national jurisdiction
failed to provide such assistance, would the question of the court's direct exercise of its
investigative powers in the territory of the State, either on its own or through agents of
the State acting on its behalf, arise.").
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and "as appropriate, seek the cooperation of any State or of the United
4
Nations" (subsection 2(e)).
Article 51 provides that "States parties shall cooperate with the
Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings
under this Statute."5 The Article enumerates a non-exclusive list of duties of States, including assistance in the identification and location of
persons (subsection 2(a)), collection of evidence (subsection 2(b)), and
service of process (subsection 2(c)). Once a request has been made, the
States parties "shall respond without undue delay to the request."6 Article 52 clarifies that this may entail requiring the State to take provisional measures, such as seizing evidence or otherwise preserving evidence or witness testimony.7 The prosecutor's requests for assistance
may be made informally, provided that the prosecutor follows up with
a formal, written request "as soon as possible."" Evidence provided by
the State may not be used in prosecution or punishment of any other
crime without the State's consent.9
B. Arrest and Pre-TrialDetention
Article 28 provides that the Presidency may, at the request of the
prosecutor, issue a warrant for the provisional arrest of a suspect. 10
Because the ICC Statute does not contemplate a separate police force,
execution of the warrant is accomplished through the cooperation of
the State in which the suspect then resides.'1 Accordingly, pursuant to
a warrant, the Court may request a State to provisionally arrest 12 and
3
detain that suspect pending transfer to the Court.
The circumstances of an arrest under Article 28 are subject to review by a judicial officer of the State where the arrest occurred.' 4 At
the hearing, the judicial officer has authority to determine only
whether the warrant has been duly served, and the rights of the accused have been respected.' 5 If the arrest is deemed valid, then the
is
State in which the arrest took place, or where the trial will occur,
6
expected to hold the person in an appropriate place of detention.'

4. Article 26 also provides that if the prosecutor decides not to pursue a prosecution, a complainant state may seek review of that decision by the Presidency of the ICC.
1994 ILC Draft, supra note 1, art. 26(5).
5. Id. art. 51(1) (emphasis added).
6. Id. art. 51(3).
7. Id. art. 52(1).
8. Id. art. 52(2).
9. Id. art. 55.
10. Id. art. 28(1).
11. Id. art. 51(1), 51(2)(d).
12. Id. art. 52(lXa).

13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. art. 53.
Id. art. 29(1).
Id.
Id. art. 29(4).
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Under Article 53, all States must cooperate in arresting and transferring individuals pursuant to a warrant relating to the crime of genocide.' 7 A State which has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with
respect to the crime in question must also comply with the Court's request for arrest and transfer, as well as give priority to a request by
the Court over requests from other States. 8 A State party which is a
party to a treaty establishing an international crime, but which has
not accepted the Court's jurisdiction with respect to that crime, is required either to transfer the accused voluntarily, or to take all necessary steps to extradite the accused.' 9 In all other cases, although the
State party must consider taking these steps, its obligation to extra20
dite or transfer the accused is limited by domestic laws.
C. Prosecution
Pursuant to Article 31, "[t]he prosecutor may request a State
party to make persons available to assist in a prosecution."21 Persons
ordered to assist in an ICC prosecution are required to follow the direction of the prosecutor, notwithstanding contrary requests by their
22
respective Governments.
D. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
Article 58 provides that States parties recognize the judgments of
the Court. Article 59 clarifies that not only must States give full faith
and credit to Court judgments, but also they must assist in the enforcement of these judgments. Thus, the Court may sentence convicted
criminals to confinement in the prisons of States that have volunteered to accept prisoners for incarceration. 23 The effectuation of the
sentence, however, remains subject to the supervision of the Court and
in accordance with Court rules.24
III. GENERAL

CONCERNS REGARDING THE CURRENT DRAFT

The ILC's provisions regarding State cooperation have been criticized for: (1) abridging the notion of complementarity by giving primacy to the ICC over decisions to investigate; (2) altering the traditional system of apprehension and surrender under international law;
(3) failing to specify the bases for a State's refusal to extradite or
transfer a person subject to an ICC arrest warrant; (4) and failing to

17. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(i).
18. Id. art. 53(2)(a)(ii).
19. Id. art. 53(b), art. 54.
20. Id. art. 53(c). States not parties to the ICC Statute may assist the ICC based
upon unilateral or ad hoc consent. Id. art. 56.
21. Id. art. 31(1).
22. 1994 ILC Draft, supra note 1, art. 31(2).
23. Id. art. 59(1).
24. Id. art. 59(3).
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address additional issues regarding re-extradition, residual supervisory
authority, and judicial assistance where the national judicial system
was no longer functioning. While other concerns may be presented by
the cooperation provisions of the Draft, absent a complaint by States
parties, those concerns have not been raised in this report.
A. State Assistance in
Complementarity

the

Investigation Of

Crimes And

Some nations have complained that the ILC Draft makes it too
easy for the prosecutor to initiate an investigation, thereby potentially
imposing the Statute's cooperative obligations upon States parties.
Israel, for example, has proposed that in order to initiate an investigation "charges . . . must be filed not by one country alone but by a
large and diverse group of countries, showing that the issue is one
which has, indeed, aroused the wrath of a significant portion of the
world."2S
Although the United States has not gone quite as far as Israel, it
proposes that Articles 25-27 be amended to give States standing to object to any investigation by the ICC prosecutor that might interfere
with a legitimate national investigation or prosecution. 26 The United
States thus proposes that a State be permitted to prevent an investigation by the ICC prosecutor, by showing that a "full," "adequate," or
"bona fide" investigation is proceeding, or will proceed, in that State
forum. 27 As noted in the Working Group's report on complementarity,
the United States seems to prefer either limiting the prosecutor's ability to commence an investigation without the consent of interested
States, or adding some sort of independent review by an entity other
than the ICC or prosecutor, regarding the need for an ICC investigation. The United States thus advocates an automatic stay of jurisdic2
tion while a State conducts a bona fide investigation. 8
At the same time that the United States and other nations propose increasing restrictions on the ICC's capacity to initiate an action,
some other nations advocate easing any restriction upon the prosecutor's ability to go forward with an investigation.2 As the New Zealand

25. Statement of H. Golan (Israel) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/C.6/50/SR (1995).
26. See United States Comments to Ad Hoc Committee Report, U.N. GAOR, 50th
Sess., at 19, 20, U.N. Doc. A/AC.244/1IAdd.2 (1995) [hereinafter United States
Comments].
27. Id. at 10.
28. Id. at 18. The Ad Hoc Committee reports note a suggestion, possibly by the
United States, that the prosecutor should suspend investigation, and that the ICC suspend jurisdiction, immediately once an interested state informs the Court that it is conducting its own bona fide investigation. Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 10, 1 51.
29. See Statement of F. Wong (New Zealand) to U.N.GA 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., at 9, $ 43, U.N. Doc A/C.6150/SR (1995) ("the prosecutor should be able to investigate and prosecute cases on his or her own initiative.").
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delegation explained: "It would [sic] completely inadmissible if the Security Council was able to prevent the Court from exercising its juris30
diction by simply claiming it had already been 'seized' of the matter."
Accordingly, a tension exists between the notion of complementarity, which establishes the primacy of national jurisdictions in investigating and prosecuting international crimes, and the possibility that
the ICC may require States to conduct an ICC investigation and to
provide other judicial assistance before that State has had an opportunity to challenge the Court's authority.
B. Easing of Traditional Principles Concerning State Assistance in the
Apprehension, Detention, and Transfer of Suspected Criminals
As several States have noted, Article 53 - the Article which directly concerns State obligations to apprehend, detain, and transfer
suspected criminals - represents a significant departure from the
traditional system of State extradition. Rather than incorporating limitations of general treaty provisions among States parties, Article 53
imposes a new strict transfer scheme. This scheme limits the role of
national courts in evaluating the grounds for arrest and extradition by
restricting review only to the adequacy of service, and the validity of
the procedures surrounding the arrest under domestic law. Moreover,
Article 53 establishes a presumption in favor of transfer to the Court
over simultaneous requests for extradition by other States pursuant to
31
treaty.
The comments of States regarding the system for apprehending,
arresting, and transferring suspects reflect a wide divergence of opinion about the wisdom of the ILC Draft approach. Some States suggest
that the balance struck by the Draft is appropriate given that the competence of the Court is limited to only the most serious international
32
crimes - those which warrant mandatory international cooperation.
These States argue that because the crimes over which the ICC would
have jurisdiction warrant a coordinated international response, it is
appropriate to have a homogenous system that transcends technical
differences in treaty law.
Other States, however, argue that, notwithstanding the value of
having a homogeneous system, the ICC statute may not properly transcend national constitutional requirements and established practices of
existing extradition treaties without violating principles of complementarity.33 These States appear to favor an "opt-in" provision by which

30. Id.
31. See generally Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 39, $ 205.
32. Id. at 39, $ 206.
33. Id. at 39, 1 205. See Comments Received Pursuant to Paragraph4 Of General
Assembly Resolution 49/53 On The Establishment Of An InternationalCriminal Court,
Ad Hoc Committee On The Establishment Of An International Criminal Court, UN.
GAOR, 50th Sess., at 10, UN. Doc. A/AC.244/l/Add.2 (1995) (expressing concern of the
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States that accept the jurisdiction of the Court are given the option of
either adopting Article 53 or applying traditional extradition
procedures.3
Finally, other nations propose various compromises to permit
greater "consideration" of national law. The Netherlands, for example,
proposes that the ICC should be empowered to invoke national law of
the territorial State to deal with questions relating to the types of responsibility, defenses, and other general principles of criminal law to
be applied. 35
In general, a fragile consensus appears to exist that a balance
must be struck between the need for the ICC to transcend traditional
extradition-treaty limitations while, at the same time, providing States
with some assurance that they may rely upon treaty protections in appropriate cases. As set forth below, the critical area of disagreement
appears to be with respect to how that balance will be struck and
what grounds may be asserted for refusing to carry out an ICC transfer request.
C.

Bases For ChallengingArrest, Extradition, or Transfer

The United States has expressed concern that the ILC Draft does
not adequately specify which bases are permissible for setting aside a
request for judicial assistance.36 As noted, the ILC Draft provides that
requests by the Court have priority over requests by nations pursuant
to existing extradition agreements, and that the Court ultimately decides whether to invalidate its prosecutor's request for transfer.37 Sev-

United States that extradition provisions of the draft statute "frequently fail to uphold
national jurisdiction"); see also Statement by I.E. Ayewah (Nigeria) to U.N.G.A. 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 5, $ 19, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR 29 (1995) ("the strict
transfer scheme envisaged in [Article 52], which bypassed national courts, continues to
be of concern."); Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR,
50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR (1995) (urging principle reliance upon national
courts and systems pursuant to principle of aut dedere, out judicare); Statement of C.
Shiqiu (China) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/
SR (1995) ('[extradition] provisions appear to be contrary to the principle" of complementarity.) [hereinafter Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.GA. 6th Comm.].
34. Statement of C. Shiqiu (China) to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., supra note 33, at 39, 9
207; see also Statement by Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of State, to U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/
50/SR.27 (1995) [hereinafter State Department Comments].
35. Statement of T. Halff to the U.N.G.A. 6th Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 5,6,
U.N. Doc A/C.6/50/SR (1995). Japan has specifically criticized this approach as potentially producing inconsistent results. Statement of H. Owada (Japan) to U.N.G.A_ 6th
Comm., U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. A/C/6.50/SR (1995) ("further discussion is
necessary in order to assess whether [application of national law] is appropriate for different national laws and definitions of crimes to result in different criminal procedures
or penalties").
36. United States Comments, supra note 26, at 28, $ 101.
37. Id.
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eral States complained that, as presently drafted, the Statute "stacks
the deck" against objections to Court requests, and gives no guidance
regarding what are even valid bases for challenging a Court or prosecutor's request for judicial assistance. 38 The United States Comments,
for example, ask rhetorically, "Are there any circumstances where a
State with a legal bar to extradition of its nationals would be required
to surrender the person to the court? 39 Based on these concerns, the
United States has proposed that the Statute contain more specific information regarding the scope of a state's obligation to arrest and/or
transfer a person to the ICC, and that the ILC Draft commentary consider encouraging a program by which States parties enter into a set
of "surrender agreements."4°
The United States expressed specific concern regarding whether a
State under the Draft Statute would be required to cooperate regardless of contrary requirements of domestic law, and regardless of
whether cooperation may require the State to reveal sensitive information or matters of national security.4 1 The United States warned that:
it is not possible for States to cooperate with the court smoothly
(and in some respects at all) unless these types of matters are clarified. If they are not, States will take it upon themselves to determine the extent of their obligations to cooperate, leading to what
will likely be inconsistent results. 42
Other States have agreed that States parties should be permitted
to refuse to comply with Court orders, but that the grounds for doing
so should be extremely narrow. These States, for example, would exclude objections that "national authorities should not have the right to
examine the warrant in relation to substantive law." 3 Rather, they
maintain, "exceptions to the obligation to surrender . . . should be
kept to the absolute minimum and they should be specifically articulated in the statute."" These States thus would consider inappropriate
such traditional limitations or exceptions as the nationality of the accused, the level of social integration, excuses and justifications under
national law, the political exception, lapse of time, or health of the
accused.45
Finally, other States have argued that the degree of national cooperation mandated by the ICC may vary depending on the nature of the
assistance sought." Thus, States may be required to permit the prose-

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 28,

103.

Id.
United States Comments, supra note 26, at 26, 9 94.
Id. at 26-27, % 95.
Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 40, 9 212.
Id. $ 214.

Id.
Ad Hoa Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 42, 9 225.
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cutor to conduct an investigation within the State's territory provided
the prosecutor complied with domestic law and informed appropriate
State authorities, because of the limited intrusion of State sovereignty.47 By contrast, activities requiring more coercive measures, such
as searches, property seizures, or arrest and surrender should, according to these States, be left to the prerogative of national police
authorities. 8
Accordingly, while differences exist as to what specific exceptions
should be permitted to a State's duty to comply with an ICC request
for judicial assistance, there appears to be general agreement that
those exceptions need to be set forth explicitly in the statute and that
the list be exhaustive.
D. Re-Extradition, Inter-State Agreements, and Non-Functioning National Judicial Systems
Finally, States have expressed concern about the absence of provisions in the Draft Statute for granting the ICC supervisory powers
where it possesses concurrent jurisdiction with a State engaged in a
bona fide prosecution, or where States are unable to provide judicial
assistance because their domestic law enforcement system is not
functioning.
Some States noted that there may be cases in which the ICC could
assist a State engaged in a bona fide investigation in obtaining the judicial assistance of other States. These States argue that because one
purpose of the statute is to encourage national prosecution of alleged
offenders, the statute should either include mutual judicial assistance
agreements or grant the Court supervisory power to facilitate cooperation in cases in which a domestic prosecution is going forward. 49
Similarly, some States expressed concern that the Statute fails to
address the issue of re-extradition, i.e., the transfer of the accused by
the court to a third state. In particular, some States questioned
whether it would be appropriate for the Court to act as a conduit for
extradition from one State to another, where the original host State
would not have permitted extradition directly to the recipient state.50
Finally, some States expressed concern that the Statute does not
account for a default procedure in cases in which the assistance of national authorities is impractical because the State does not have a
functioning national judicial system.5 1

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.

Id.
Ad Hoc Comm. Report, supra note 2, at 44,
Id. at 42, T 220.
Id. at 44, T 236.

236.
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SUB-COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP ANALYSIS

To date, the ILA working group on national cooperation of the
Sub-Committee on the Permanent International Criminal Court has
not attempted to form a consensus on the foregoing concerns about the
ILC Draft provisions on cooperation by national courts. The following
thoughts, however, are offered for further consideration and
discussion.
A. Investigation
The United States suggestion to afford States greater say in
whether they will be required to assist in an investigation before the
investigation begins does not appear to have generated substantial interest among other commentators. Although the suggestion has some
merit, most commentators apparently are concerned that adding another layer of administrative procedure to initiating an investigation
may cause unacceptable expense, delay, and interference with valid
investigations.
As noted in the Working Group Report on Complementarity, an
expedited "stay" proceeding may provide a viable compromise. For example, the Statute could provide that a State - upon a proper showing that an ICC request is unnecessary, inappropriate, or imposes an
impermissible burden - may request an order of the Court staying
the prosecutor from conducting certain objectionable parts of its investigation. The standard for granting such a stay would be high. The
State would be required to show a significant likelihood that it will
prevail in challenging the Court's jurisdiction or the prosecutor's request, and must show a potential for irreparable injury if the State is
required to comply with the prosecutor's request. The relatively high
standard of proof would likely limit attempts by States to use these
challenges as a means of delaying or compromising investigations. Absent compelling reasons, an investigation could go forward until the
Court had an opportunity to consider its jurisdiction.
B. Principles Concerning State Assistance in the Apprehension, Detention, and Transfer of Suspected Criminals
As noted, there is a wide spectrum of opinion regarding whether
the Court should have separate and superior authority to compel the
transfer of alleged criminals, or whether the Court should be required
to rely principally upon traditional extradition arrangements. Although
reasonable minds could differ on this point, States advocating principal
reliance on a new "transfer" authority may have the better view. One
principal function of the Statute is to assure that prosecutions of
crimes against the international community will go forward notwithstanding the parochial interests of a specific state. In order for the ICC
to accomplish this goal, and to assure a coordinated international response to serious international crime, the Court must have some
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method of by-passing the potential obstacles created by the extradition
treaties of a specific state. The ILC Draft reflects this goal, and permite the ICC to transcend the limitations of specific extradition treaties where a State has acceded to the Court's jurisdiction with respect
to the crime at issue.
At present, the draft attempts to accommodate the interests of
States in retaining their extradition policies by making transfer voluntary as to crimes for which a State has not acknowledged the Court's
jurisdiction. To the extent that this compromise is considered inadequate, future drafts may further accommodate the concerns of States
about the need to fulfill extradition treaty commitments by broadening
the ICC's ability to consider treaty obligations. The ILC may, for example, wish to consider amending Article 52 to indicate that the Court, in
exercising its transfer powers, may give due consideration to the national laws of the host state. The ICC would thus be expected, to the
fullest extent possible, to act consistently with national law of the territorial State relating to responsibility to transfer, defenses, and other
general principles of criminal law.
C. Bases for ChallengingArrest, Extradition, or Transfer
As noted, there appears to be a general consensus that the ILC
Draft needs to enumerate the specific bases for a State to refuse to
comply with a request for judicial assistance. 52 As presently drafted,
the Statute gives no guidance in identifying valid bases for challenging
the Court or prosecutor's request or for otherwise resisting a Court order.53 This may create enforcement problems by placing national authorities in the awkward position of either violating their domestic law
or violating their treaty obligation to provide judicial assistance. Accordingly, the ILA Committee may wish to consider drafting a model
set of defenses for submission to the ILC. As a starting point, the
Committee may wish to consider the suggestion that the Statute exclude non-constitutional, non-fundamental, and/or discretionary bases
for refusing an ICC request, such as the nationality of the accused, the
level of social integration, excuses and justifications under national
law, the political question doctrine, laches, or health of the accused.
D.

Supervisory and/orDefault Provisions

As noted, the Statute is silent on issues of potential concern regarding assistance by the Court where it has ceded jurisdiction to a
State, or where a State is unable to provide judicial assistance because
its court processes are not functioning.
A significant issue arises in cases in which the Court has been deprived of jurisdiction because of the existence of an effective and avail-

52. United States Comments, supra note 26, at 28, T 101.
53. Id.
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able domestic forum, whose efforts are frustrated by the failure of
other nations to cooperate with that state. In such cases, it may be appropriate to grant the Court limited "supervisory" powers. Under such
a supervisory powers clause, a State may request the assistance of the
Court to command judicial assistance where that State's ability to
compel the assistance of other States is inferior to that of the Court.
Such a power would also resolve the question of re-extradition, as it
would clarify that States have a right to expand their powers of mutual assistance to parallel that of the Court where the Court possesses
concurrent jurisdiction.
Another issue concerns what measures are available to the Court
in the event that the State to whom a request for judicial assistance is
made does not have a functioning national judicial system. Although
this is a significant concern, it may not be necessary, or more to the
point, wise to attempt to address this in the Draft Statute. Presumably, in a case in which a State has deteriorated to the point where its
judicial system is no longer functioning, the U.N. may consider other
efforts to maintain peace and order in the region, including dispatching security forces to the State. Under these circumstances, it is not
difficult to imagine that peace keeping forces could provide judicial assistance to the Court. Introducing the notion of U.N. troops to assist
the Court, however, would not likely be politically wise. Accordingly,
given that this is a potentially touchy subject, and the issue is likely to
be resolved through extra-judicial events, it may be best not to propose
any new sections or language addressing this topic.
V.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing is offered as a basis for further discussion among
the ILA Working Group and Committee about cooperation with national systems. As noted, despite criticisms that have been directed at
the Statute's failure to fully define the principle of cooperation with
national systems, the general principle appears sound, and should be
encouraged with appropriate refinements.

